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SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION
After Plaintiff William F. Saponaro, Jr. was arrested for

engaging in a sexual encounter with a minor who used Defendant
Grindr, LLC’s online social networking service to arrange the
encounter, he sued Defendant for negligence for allowing a minor
child to access and utilize its social networking site. This
matter comes before the Court upon Defendant’s motion to dismiss

[Docket Item 5] under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim for which relief can be granted.
Because Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the Communications
Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230, the Court will grant Defendant’s
motion and will dismiss this action.
II.

BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are drawn from the Complaint and are

accepted as true for purposes of this motion. 1
Plaintiff is an adult male who owns a construction and
restoration company in the Cape May community. (Compl. ¶¶ 1,
14.) Defendant is a Limited Liability Company, organized in the
State of California, which owns and operates two all-male online
geo-social networking applications “Grindr” and “GrindrX.” (Id.
at ¶¶ 2–4.)
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Although, as a general rule, a party’s reliance upon factual
materials extraneous to the pleadings would require the Court to
treat a motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment under Rule
56, see Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 634 F.2d 127,
129 (3d Cir. 1980), the Court may consider a “document integral
to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint,” or an
“undisputedly authentic document” without converting the motion.
In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280,
287 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec.
Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) and Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196
(3d Cir. 1993)). In this case, the Complaint explicitly relies
upon Defendant’s age restriction, found in its terms of service.
As the parties do not dispute the language of Defendant’s terms
of service, the Court will consider the Terms of Service (Ex. C
to Def. Mot. to Dismiss [Docket Item 5-5]) for purposes of this
motion.
2

Plaintiff claims that on June 21, 2012, a 13 year old minor
(the “minor”) used Defendant’s GrindrX service to solicit a
sexual encounter with Mark LeMunyon (“LeMunyon”), a 24 year old
man who subscribes to Defendant’s online services. (Id. at ¶¶ 4,
5.) Upon receiving the minor’s solicitation, LeMunyon contacted
Plaintiff and arranged a sexual encounter between himself, the
minor, and Plaintiff. 2 (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 7.) The arranged “three
party sexual liason” came to fruition at Plaintiff’s home in
Cape May some time during the following week. (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 7.)
On June 28, 2012, Plaintiff was arrested in Cape May County, New
Jersey and charged with sexual assault and endangering the
welfare of a child in connection with the aforementioned sexual
encounter. (Id. at ¶ 8.) He currently faces charges in excess of
20 years in prison. (Id.)
On June 20, 2014, Plaintiff filed the instant action
against Defendant in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Cape May County. [Docket Item 1.] In Count One,
Plaintiff claims that Defendant was negligent by allowing the
minor to hold himself out as an adult of consenting age on its
online service. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Specifically, Plaintiff asserts
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It appears that LeMunyon and Plaintiff had some form of preexisting relationship prior to the operative events of this
case; however, the nature and extent of that relationship is
neither detailed in the Complaint nor relevant for determining
the merits of Defendant’s motion.
3

that he reasonably relied upon Defendant’s age-restriction (a
minimum of 18 years of age, 21 years in places where 21 years is
the age of majority) found in the Grindr Terms of Service, and
that Defendant’s negligent failure to enforce its agerestriction directly resulted in Plaintiff’s arrest and
corresponding financial expenditures. (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 11, 14–17;
Pl.’s Br. Ex. D. at 1.) Count Two of Plaintiff’s Complaint
asserts a cause of action against Defendant for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. (Compl. ¶¶ 18–25.)
Defendant removed the action to this Court and filed a
motion to dismiss [Docket Items 1, 5.] Defendant argues that it
is immune from liability in its capacity as an “interactive
computer service” provider under the Communications Decency Act,
47 U.S.C. § 230 (“CDA”). (Def.’s Br. 1.) Defendant further
argues that it did not owe any duty to Plaintiff under
traditional negligence principles and did not proximately cause
Plaintiff’s damages. (Id. at 1, 2.)
For the reasons set forth below, the Court holds that
Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the Communications Decency Act.
Furthermore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims of
negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress fail
as a matter of law. Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed with
prejudice.
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court must “accept all
factual allegations as true, construe the Complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under
any reasonable reading of the Complaint, the plaintiff may be
entitled to relief.” Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d
116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012). The complaint must allege sufficient
factual matter, which, when accepted as true, “state[s] a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A motion to dismiss may be granted only if a court
concludes that the plaintiff has failed to set forth fair notice
of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests that
make such a claim plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Although Rule 8 does not require
“detailed factual allegations,” it requires “more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
IV.

DISCUSSION
The salient issues in this case are whether Defendant is

immune from liability under the Communications Decency Act, 47
U.S.C. § 230 (the “CDA”), and whether Plaintiff has otherwise
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pled sufficient facts to state claims for negligence and
negligent infliction of emotional distress.
A. Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Communications Decency
Act.
The CDA’s “Good Samaritan” clause provides, in pertinent
part, “No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. §
230(c)(1) (emphasis added). Section 230 also provides that “[n]o
cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed
under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this
section.” Id. § 230(e)(3).
As a practical matter, this statutory language “‘precludes
courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer
service provider in a publisher’s role’ and bars ‘lawsuits
seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a
publisher’s traditional editorial functions such as deciding
whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content.’”
Green v. America Online, 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003)
(quoting Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th
Cir. 1997). Accordingly, interactive computer service providers
cannot be held liable for publishing harmful information that is
generated by a third party. For example, if an online tabloid
enables users to anonymously upload comments to its stories, the
6

tabloid would not be liable for defamatory statements within
those comments. See Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment
Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 408 (6th Cir. 2014) (“If a website
displays content that is created entirely by third parties, then
it is only a service provider with respect to that content—and
thus is immune from claims predicated on that content.”). 3
The Third Circuit has recognized the CDA’s immunity
provision to protect internet service providers from allegations
of negligently failing to monitor their websites. See Green, 318
F.3d at 471. In Green, the plaintiff sued a chat room’s host for
defamatory statements generated by another user. Id. at 469,
471. The plaintiff sought to hold the host liable for failing to
monitor its chat room. Id. The Court of Appeals barred the
claim, stating that monitoring is a function “quintessentially
related to a publisher’s role[,]” liability for which is
specifically proscribed by the CDA. Id. at 471.
In this case, Plaintiff’s claims fail for the same reason.
Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant is an interactive
computer service provider within the meaning of the CDA because
its website gives subscribers access to a common server for
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This principal is not without its limits. The CDA was
to immunize internet service providers for all activity
websites; they are, indeed, still responsible for their
wrongful conduct. See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com Inc.,
1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003).
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not meant
on their
own
339 F.3d

purposes of social networking. See § 230(f)(2) (defining an
“interactive computer service” as “any information service,
system, or access software that provides or enables computer
access by multiple users to a computer server. . . .”).
Plaintiff also seeks to hold Defendant responsible for failing
to monitor its website: in the Complaint, Plaintiff repeatedly
characterizes Defendant’s wrongdoing as “failing to properly
supervise its site.” (See Compl. ¶¶ 11–12, 19–20). Plaintiff
argues that as a consequence, a thirteen-year-old was allowed to
use its services and to hold himself out as an adult, which
created the circumstance that ultimately led to Plaintiff’s
arrest. Plaintiff therefore claims that Defendant should be
liable for the harm caused by publishing the minor’s assertion
that he was over eighteen years of age. Because the Third
Circuit has expressly interpreted the CDA to immunize
interactive service providers from this type of liability, see
Green, 318 F.3d at 471, Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed as
a matter of law.
The Fifth Circuit has addressed CDA immunity in a similar
factual context. In Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir.
2008), the mother of a 13 year old girl sued a social network
provider for allowing her daughter to access its website and
meet a 19 year old man, who used the website to arrange a
meeting and sexually assault her. Id. at 416–17. The mother
8

alleged that the social network provider, by failing to
implement institutional safeguards, violated its duty to protect
minors who use its services. Id. at 419. The Fifth Circuit
rejected this argument, stating that this categorization was
“merely another way of claiming that [the social network
provider] was liable for publishing the communications” between
her daughter and the 19 year old man. Id. at 420 (emphasis
added).
Furthermore, despite Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary,
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Fair Housing Council of San
Fernando Valley v. Roomates.com, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008),
does not affect the Court’s holding because Defendant did not
actively develop illegal content on its site. In Fair Housing,
the Ninth Circuit refused to grant CDA protection to a housing
website that specifically asked users to disclose their sex,
family status and sexual orientation in violation of the Fair
Housing Act. Id. at 1166. The Ninth Circuit held that by
eliciting specific unlawful information from users, the website
acted as a developer of content, rather than merely a publisher,
and was therefore subject to liability. Id.
Plaintiff attempts to analogize this case to Fair Housing
and its progeny by claiming that Defendant was not merely a
conduit, but rather an active developer, of the information that
is published on its site. To support this argument, Plaintiff
9

relies on the fact that Defendant’s site “contains questions to
be answered including a profile, the posting of pictures, and
dropdown menus suggesting content.” (Pl.’s Br. at 13.)
The Court does not find the comparison to Fair Housing
persuasive. Even assuming Plaintiff’s factual assertions to be
true, as the Court must, the questions that Defendant poses to
its subscribers when creating a profile substantively differ
from those posed by the defendant in Fair Housing in one
significant respect: they do not develop content that facially
violates a state or federal statute. Defendant’s online
questionnaire asks users to enter information about themselves,
but these questions are facially benign. Plaintiff does not
allege – nor does the Court find – that Defendants’
questionnaire solicits from users information that is illegal.
This distinction is readily apparent in Fair Housing.
There, the Court specifically noted that “[a] dating website
that requires users to enter their sex, race, religion and
marital status through drop-down menus . . . does not contribute
to any alleged illegality,” since “[i]t is perfectly legal to
discriminate along those lines in dating, and thus there can be
no claim based solely on the content of these questions.” Fair
Housing, 521 F.3d at 1169 and n.3. Similarly, in this case,
Defendant merely “provid[ed] neutral tools to carry out what may
be unlawful or illicit [conduct]”; under Fair Housing, such
10

conduct does not amount to “development” under section 230 of
the CDA. Id.
Nor is the Court persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that
Congressional intent warrants a narrow construction of the CDA.
(Pl.’s Br. at 9.) The language of the CDA unambiguously
prohibits interactive service providers like GrinderX from being
“treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
As the Fourth Circuit noted in Zeran, “[b]y its plain language,
§ 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that
would make service providers liable for information originating
with a third-party user of the service.” Zeran, 129 F.3d 327,
330. Where, as here, the language of the statute is clear,
“there is no need to pursue a deeper inquiry into its meaning.”
Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 23–54 (1992)
(citations omitted); see also Lamie v. United States Tr., 540
U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (“When the statute’s language is plain, the
sole function of the courts – at least where the disposition
required by the test is not absurd – is to enforce it according
to its terms.”); Alston v. Countrywide Financial Corp., 585 F.3d
753, 762 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that district court’s reliance
on purpose of statute after having discerned a contrary plain
language meaning was error); Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d
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137, 141 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Where the statutory language is plain
and unambiguous, further inquiry is not required.”).
The Court also notes that the CDA manifests a Congressional
policy supporting broad immunity. Section 230 was enacted to
“maintain the robust nature of internet communication and,
accordingly, to limit government interference in the medium to a
minimum.” Obado v. Magedson, 2014 WL 3778261, at *3 (D.N.J. Jul.
31, 2014) (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330). The statute provides
that “[t]he Internet and other interactive computer services
offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse,
unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad
avenues for intellectual activity.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3). It
additionally states that the “policy of the United States” is to
“preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently
exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services,
unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” Id. § 230(b)(2).
Courts have promulgated Congress’s intent by applying CDA
immunity according to its own clear terms. See, e.g., Zeran, 129
F.3d at 331. This Court must do the same, and it is not this
Court’s function or role to substitute its judgment for the
policy choices made by Congress in promoting communications on
the internet. Holding interactive service providers liable for
third-party communications would have chilling implications for
free speech on the internet. Specifically, if social network
12

hosts are faced with liability every time third-party
communications on their networks result in harm, they are left
with two extreme courses of action if they wish to ensure
insulation from liability: either over-police their networks,
taking down communications that might ultimately be harmless;
or, strip users of the ability to post communications
altogether. Id.; see also, Dimeo v. Max, 433 F.Supp.2d 523, 528
(E.D. Pa. 2006) (noting that without CDA protection, interactive
computer services would either have to employ an army of highlytrained monitors to patrol its services, or shut down internet
forums altogether). Such an outcome would contravene the express
purpose of the CDA.
Because the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are barred
by the CDA, Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted.
B. Plaintiff has failed to state claims for negligence and
negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Even if the CDA were not implicated in this case, Plaintiff
has sufficiently pled a claim for negligence or negligent
infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”). To establish a cause
of action for negligence in New Jersey, a plaintiff must
establish four elements: (1) a duty of care owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty by the
defendant, (3) actual and proximate causation, and (4) damages.
Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Utility Co., 59 A.3d
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561, 571 (N.J. 2013). To establish a cause of action for NIED,
the defendant’s negligence must have caused severe emotional
distress. See Gendek v. Poblete, 654 A.2d 970, 972 (N.J. 1995).
Plaintiff’s claims for negligence and negligent infliction
of emotional distress must fail because the Defendant did not
owe him a duty of care. To determine whether a defendant owes a
duty to the plaintiff, a “significant consideration” is whether
the plaintiff is a foreseeable victim of the defendant’s
conduct. Carvalho v. Toll Bros. and Developers, 675 A.2d 209,
212 (N.J. 1996). “Once the foreseeability of an injured party is
established, . . . considerations of fairness and policy govern
whether the imposition of a duty is warranted.” Carter Lincoln–
Mercury, Inc. v. EMAR Group, Inc., 638 A.2d 1288, 1288 (N.J.
1994). This assessment of fairness and policy “involves
identifying, weighing, and balancing several factors—the
relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk,
the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the public
interest in the proposed solution.” Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo
Realtors, 625 A.2d 1110, 1116 (N.J. 1993) (citing Goldberg v.
Housing Auth., 186 A.2d 291 (1962)).
In this case, Plaintiff cannot establish a duty because he
was not a foreseeable victim of Defendant’s alleged negligence.
The communications that occurred on Defendant’s website that
ultimately led to the illegal sexual encounter were exclusively
14

between LeMunyon and the minor, both of whom were registered
subscribers to the website. (See Compl. ¶¶ 5, 6.) Plaintiff does
not allege to be a subscriber to the website, nor does he allege
to have participated in the communications with the minor on
Defendant’s site. Indeed, there is no allegation that Plaintiff
ever used Defendant’s site at all. He was not a foreseeable
plaintiff in this case, and therefore Defendant did not owe a
duty of care towards him. Plaintiff asserts that “the defendants
[sic] must clearly have foreseen the potential for use by
minors.” (Pl.’s Opp. Br. at 14.) This argument, although perhaps
relevant to the question of whether harm to an underage user of
Grindr was foreseeable, does not show that there was a
foreseeable risk that a non-Grindr user would be injured by the
online actions of a minor. 4

4

Furthermore, the Hopkins fairness factors weigh against
imposing a duty on Defendant to monitor its website. With
regards to the relationship between the parties, the Complaint
does not allege the existence of any direct relationship between
Plaintiff and Defendant; rather, Plaintiff alleges that he was a
third-party who utilized Defendant’s services merely via
LeMunyon, who acted as an intermediary. (See Compl. ¶¶ 5, 6.)
Further, concerning the ability to exercise care, the Third
Circuit has previously held, in a similar context, that
publishers of online content do not have the ability to exercise
care over user-generated content. See generally, Am. Civil
Liberties Union v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2008).
Finally, with regards to the public interest, this Opinion has
already touched upon the express public policy that supports CDA
immunity. This same policy, namely the promotion of free speech
on the internet, weighs against imposing a common-law duty on
Defendant to monitor its website for the protection of nonusers. This Court does not address, in this instance, whether an
15

Given this disposition, there is no need to address
Defendant’s alternative ground that Plaintiff was the
intervening cause of his own harm, since it was Plaintiff who
met and had contact with this 13 year-old boy, not Defendant.
Much common sense supports this argument, but it may not be
resolvable on a motion to dismiss in which Plaintiff’s
allegation, that he was unaware of the boy’s age, must be
accepted as true.
Thus, in addition to being barred by the CDA, Plaintiff’s
negligence and NIED claims also fail as a matter of law.
V.

CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Communications

Decency Act and because Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a
claim for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional
distress, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). An accompanying Order will be
entered.

March 13, 2015
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

online dating service such as this defendant has a duty to
protect minors who seek to register by rejecting such
registration.
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